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A B S T R A C T
This article argues that MEPs from national parties repre-
sented in the Council of Ministers are more active as rapport-
eurs on Codecision legislation than MEPs from national
parties not represented in the Council. EP rapporteurs can 
be thought of as informed actors offering non-binding
advice to the EP plenary. Expert committees and the Council
presidency play a similar role in the Council. Compared with
rapporteurs from parties not represented in the Council, EP
rapporteurs from parties represented in the Council may
incur lower costs in coordinating their proposals with the
informed actors in the Council. If this is the case, they should
be more interested in writing Codecision reports than are
MEPs from parties not represented in the Council. This
possibility is investigated using a data set consisting of all
Codecision legislation initiated by the Commission between
1999 and 2004.
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The workings of the Codecision procedure and the politics inside the EU insti-
tutions have been the topic of several studies (see Hörl et al., 2005, for a recent
review). In contrast, the effects of the Codecision procedure on politics inside
the EP have until recently been studied only in terms of voting behaviour
under different majority rules (e.g. Hix et al., 2003; Kreppel, 2000). The aim
of this article is to investigate whether national party representation in the
Council of Ministers influences the number of codecision reports written.
The model presented here highlights the different incentive structures faced
by a party, depending on whether it is represented in the Council of 
Ministers or not. Rapporteurs from national parties represented in the
Council have lower costs of coordinating their behaviour with actors inside
the Council than do rapporteurs from national parties not represented in the
Council. This results in higher expected payoffs from writing codecision
reports. Although the rights to reports are distributed proportionally, recent
research has shown that the allocation of reports is not fully proportional
(Benedetto, 2005; Kaeding, 2004; Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003). This paper’s
contribution to this literature is threefold. First, it offers a theoretical expla-
nation of the allocation of reports in the context of the Amsterdam version
of the Codecision procedure. Second, it presents an original data set consist-
ing of all codecision reports initiated by the Commission since the start of
1999 and allocated to a national party during the Fifth EP. Third, it applies
a statistical method that allows not only for an estimation of the distribution
of codecision reports, but also for an estimation of why some parties do not
write codecision reports.
The first section reviews the literature on the role of the European Parlia-
ment in the Amsterdam version of the Codecision procedure (Codecision II)
and the literature on the internal organization of the Parliament of relevance
to the involvement of the EP in the Codecision procedure. The following
section presents a model of the Codecision procedure as a signalling game
with two senders. The model predicts different levels of involvement as a
function of whether actors are represented in both the Council of Ministers
and the European Parliament or only in the EP. The third section presents the
data set used to test the prediction of the model and the statistical technique.
The results are presented in the fourth section. The final section concludes by
discussing the implications of the findings and areas for future research.
Codecision and the European Parliament
The literature on the codecision procedure is vast. A complete review is
beyond the scope of this paper (see Selck, 2004). Only the main theoretical
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and empirical findings related to the workings of the Codecision procedure
as amended in the Amsterdam treaty of relevance to the allocation of co-
decision reports are discussed.
Formal models of the Amsterdam version of the Codecision procedure
(Codecision II) highlight the decline of the power of the Commission, and
show that the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament have become
equal partners. Support from both the Council and the EP is needed in order
for new Codecision legislation to be adopted. Furthermore, neither of the
institutions has formal agenda-setting power in the last stage of the
procedure, the Conciliation Committee (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000; Corbett,
2001; Crombez, 2001; Crombez et al., 2000). There is not complete consensus
on these issues. Burns (2004) argues that most of the models neglect the role
of the Commission. She claims that the Commission is still powerful because
it offers opinions on EP amendments in the first and second readings. Second
reading amendments not accepted by the Commission need to be adopted by
unanimity in the Council rather than by qualified majority (QMV). However,
if a qualified majority in the Council accepts the amendments, the EP and the
Council will be able to adopt these amendments in the Conciliation
Committee. Hence the Commission is able to delay the adaptation of these
amendments only to the next stage in the process.
Empirical work on Codecision II finds that the ability of the institutions
to agree on legislation at an early stage has increased compared with Co-
decision I. One of the changes in the Codecision procedure from Maastricht
to Amsterdam was to allow the Council of Ministers to adopt legislation at
its first reading if the member states accepted the European Parliament’s
proposal (Article 251). The ability to conclude earlier may also have been
enhanced as the actors gained more experience with the procedure or as a
new culture of cooperation developed (Corbett et al., 2003; Shackleton, 2000;
Shackleton and Raunio, 2003).
Existing overviews of the internal organization of the EP are numerous
(Corbett et al., 2000; Judge and Earnshaw, 2003; Katz and Wessels, 1999;
Westlake, 1994). The key findings are that the EP has developed a sophisti-
cated committee system to deal effectively with the voluminous legislative
output of the Union (Bowler and Farrell, 1995; Kasack, 2004; Selck and
Steunenberg, 2004; McElroy, in this issue). The committee system is party
based (Whitaker, 2001, 2005). The rapporteurs act as agenda-setters inside the
EP because they are responsible for drawing up the position of the Committee
and presenting the legislative report to the plenary session (Tsebelis, 1995).
The chair and party group coordinators in the relevant committee negotiate
over how the reports should be allocated (Wurzel, 1999). This negotiation has
been described as ‘an elaborated poker-game’, in which the coordinators are
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rewarded with property rights over reports as a function of their party
group’s size (Corbett et al., 2000). The exact rules of the ‘bidding’ process
might differ across committees, but coordinators may have an incentive to
bluff each other into paying more than necessary for a report that they are
interested in, by expressing interest in some reports just to increase the price.
Although country size and party group size correlate well with the number
of committee reports allocated, significant differences in the involvement of
MEPs from national parties of similar size can be found (Mamadouh and
Raunio, 2003). It has also been shown that those who choose to get involved
as rapporteurs have different backgrounds from those who do not get
involved. The differences are related both to expertise and to constituency
interests (Kaeding, 2004).
An important motivating factor in the recent focus on the EP committee
system has been the increased legislative power of the Parliament. However,
potential differences in the incentives to be involved as a rapporteur in the
EP have not been linked theoretically to the features of the Codecision
procedure. The aim of the next section is to establish a model of how national
party delegations play their cards in the report allocation game.
Model
We can think of the Codecision procedure as a signalling game with more
than one sender (e.g. McCarty and Meirowitz, forthcoming). Two institutions,
r1 and r2, bargain over a policy p ∈ X[0,1] in a one-dimensional policy space
ℜ1. It is common knowledge that actors in both institutions have policy pref-
erences drawn from a distribution G(·) on X. The responsibility for propos-
ing a new policy is delegated to a sender inside both institutions. Assume
two senders, s1 and s2, independently drawn from a distribution of types θs1,
θs2 ∈ Θ = [0, 1] with a message space ms1, ms2 ∈ M = [0, 1]. It is common
knowledge that both θ’s are drawn from a distribution F(·) on Θ. The prefer-
ences of the two senders may differ. If the two senders send the same message
to r1, then r1 selects the corresponding p, ms1, ms2 = p ∈ X = [0, 1]. Actors have
quadratic loss functions around their ideal policy. The institutions r1 and r2
receive expected payoffs EUi = –(p – xi)2, whereas s1 and s2 receive expected
payoffs of EUi = –(p – xi)2 – ci, where ci is the cost associated with coordinat-
ing the message with the other sender. If ms1,  ms2, r1 proposes its ideal policy
p–si to r2, ignoring the messages from s1 and s2. With probability q, 0 < q < 1,
r2 accepts p–si, and all actors i ∈ [s1, s2, r1, r2] receive an expected payoff of Ui
= –δi(p–si – xi)2. With probability (1 – q), r2 does not accept; the expected
payoffs are then
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EUi = –δi2 [( ) – xi]2,
where α + β = 1, but the values are unknown, corresponding to a Nash
bargaining solution. We see that the senders pay a cost ci only if they coordi-
nate, because it is cost free for them to send any m without prior coordina-
tion with the other sender. The focus in this paper is limited to an evaluation
of the senders’ incentives to be involved in the process. Two factors are of
importance: (a) the cost of coordinating m with the other sender and (b) the
resulting policy if coordination takes place. The cost is related not to the policy
but to factors related to the sender’s type. The willingness to be involved can
be rewritten as:
Be involved if: ci  (p – xi)2 (1)
And: ci  δi(p–si – xi)2 q (2)
And: ci  (1 – q)δi2 [( ) – xi]2 (3)
We see that a sender chooses to be involved if the cost of being involved is
equal to, or lower than, the expected policy payoff resulting from the involve-
ment. The expected policy payoff of being involved will have to be either
equal to, or higher than, the expected payoff from not being involved. The
fulfilment of these two conditions depends on five factors; the sender’s cost,
ci; the sender’s policy position, xi ; the sender’s discount factor, δi; the policy
adopted without si’s involvement times its probability; and the relative power
of the two institutions when bargaining with each other in the last stage of
the procedure. If the cost increases, the payoff of being involved goes down,
holding the other factors constant. The potential policy change resulting from
si’s involvement is positively associated with willingness to be involved.
Hence, as the stakes of the issues go up, senders with higher costs are willing
to participate. The higher parties’ discount payoffs (1 – δ) in the future
compared with payoffs today, the more willing they are to be involved. As
the difference increases between the policy adopted with si’s involvement and
the policy adopted without si’s involvement, the willingness to be involved
increases. The bargaining power of the institutions whose collective prefer-
ence is located furthest away from those of sender si is positively associated
with willingness to be involved in the process. This is the same for both
senders. The conditions for both senders sending informative signals, the
same m, are that conditions (1), (2) and (3) hold for both senders simul-
taneously and that r1 prefers ms1 = ms2 = p to any p  ms1, = ms2. The condition
for this is
α βp pr r1 2
2
+
α βp pr r1 2
2
+
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Ur1(p)  δ(p – xr1)q  δ2(1 – q)( ) ∀p.
Hence there may exist an informative equilibrium if δ is sufficiently low that
s1, s2 and r1 prefer p to the discounted value of any other p that may
materialize from continuing the game. The sufficient δ is decreasing as
∑i∈s1,s2,r1(p – xi) → . As the differences of the policy preferences of the actors
involved increase, future payoffs have to be discounted more heavily in order
for an informative equilibrium to exist. In other words, the closer the policy
preferences of the involved actors, the more likely it is that an informative
equilibrium will exist.
The right to draw up a proposal for a piece of legislation in the relevant
committee and in the plenary session of the Parliament is allocated to an indi-
vidual MEP, called the rapporteur. The right to be involved as a rapporteur
is a function of the size of the party group and the national party. We can
combine the rights to be involved, k, and the cost of being involved, c, to find
the marginal rate of substitution between the frequency of involvement and
costs. Let the frequency be defined by Li = (ki – ci)/ci. Parties with higher
costs of coordinating their message will hence write fewer reports.1
H1: Parties with lower costs of coordinating their message with the sender from
the Council will be more frequently involved as EP rapporteurs than parties with
higher coordination costs.
Data
The dependent variable is the number of codecision reports written by a
national party in a given year. The data set consists of all codecision reports
initiated by the Commission between 1999 and 2003, i.e. labelled
COD1999/xx/xx or later.2 Legislation initiated earlier but considered during
this period is excluded, as is legislation where more than one MEP acts as
rapporteur (co-rapporteurships) or legislation on which no MEP acts as
rapporteur. Reports allocated to MEPs from Luxembourg are excluded owing
to missing data on some of the independent variables. This gives a total of
372 Codecision reports. Once Luxembourg is excluded, there were 106
national parties present in the EP during the period under study. The total
number of observations is 529; 360 of these observations take the value 0, and
169 take positive values. The maximum number of reports allocated to a
national party in any one year is 11; the mean is 0.704. Because the phenom-
enon of interest is the number of reports allocated to party i in a given year,
the dependent variable is best described as a count outcome. It cannot take
α βp pr r1 2
2
+
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negative values, and its measurement is discrete. Hence, a count model seems
more appropriate than a standard ordinary least squares model.
The standard count model is the Poisson regression model, which
assumes that the conditional variance is equal to the conditional mean. If the
conditional variance is greater than the conditional mean, the Poisson regres-
sion model will be consistent but inefficient, with standard errors biased
downwards. This might result in rejection of the null hypothesis in cases
where it should not be rejected. The negative binomial regression model
allows for the conditional variance to exceed the conditional mean, by esti-
mating the conditional mean as a random variable consisting of the indepen-
dent variables and a random disturbance term. The random disturbance term
has the effect of allowing for variance on the dependent variable for obser-
vations with the same values on the independent variables. This is owing to
unobserved heterogeneity in the data, captured by the random disturbance
term. It may, however, be the case that the reasons for not writing codecision
reports are different from the factors that influence the number of codecision
reports a party writes. For example, the reasons for most Eurosceptic parties
not writing codecision reports might be very different from the reasons for
Dutch MEPs being overrepresented (Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003). To take
account of this possibility, the process that generates zero counts may be
modelled separately, as a binary logistic model. Combining the additional
zero outcome process with the negative binomial model from above gives the
zero-inflated negative binomial model. This model produces separate esti-
mates for the non-zero and zero outcomes (Long, 1997: 217–50). The co-
efficients for the count outcome are labelled B, and the binary zero-count
coefficients are labelled Y.
The independent variables of interest for the theory are government, policy
and partysize. Government is a dichotomous variable taking the value 1 if the
party was a member of the national government at the start of the year, 0
otherwise. Table 1 provides an overview of the governing parties in the
member states. Policy captures the effect of policy location. I use NOMINATE
scores on the first dimension from the first half of the 1999–2004 EP (see Hix
et al., 2005). This dimension can be understood as a version of the normal
left–right policy dimension (Hix, 2001, 2002b). Higher values indicate
locations further to the right in the policy space. Partysize is the number of
representatives in the national party delegation to the European Parliament.
To control for the effects of parties’ attitude towards Europe on their
uptake of reports, data from an expert survey are used (Marks and Steenber-
gen, 2004). The data set contains four variables relevant for this study: dissent,
position, salience and EP. Dissent is a measure of internal dissent in the party
over European integration. The scale goes from 1 to 5, where 1 represents
European Union Politics 7(1)3 6
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Table 1 Governing parties in the 15 EU member states 1999–2003, as of 1 January each year
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Austria SPÖ/ ÖVP SPÖ/ ÖVP ÖVP + FPÖ ÖVP + FPÖ ÖVP + FPÖ
Belgium CVP + PSC + SP + PS VLD + PRL/FDF + SP + VLD + PRL/FDF + SP + PS + VLD + PRL/FDF + SP + VLD + PRL/FDF + SP + PS + 
PS + Ecolo + Agalev Ecolo + Agalev PS + Ecolo + Agalev Ecolo + Agalev
Denmark SD + RV SD + RV SD + RV V + KF V + KF
Germany SPD + Die Grünen SPD + Die Grünen SPD + Die Grünen SPD + Die Grünen SPD + Die Grünen
Finland SDP + KOK + SFP + SDP + KOK + SFP + SDP + KOK + SFP + SDP + KOK + SFP + SDP + KOK + SFP + 
VAS + VIHR VAS + VIHR VAS + VIHR VAS + VIHR VAS + VIHR
France PS + PCF + PRS + PS + PCF + PRS + PS + PCF + PRS/PRG + PS + PCF + PRS/PRG + RPR + UDF + DL
MDC + Verts MDC + Verts MDC + Verts MDC + Verts
Greece PASOK PASOK PASOK PASOK PASOK
Ireland FF + PD FF + PD FF + PD FF + PD FF + PD
Italy DS + PPI + RI + UDR + DS + PPI + RI + PDCI + DS + PPI + RI + PDCI + FI + AN + LN + CCD + CDU FI + AN + LN + CCD + CDU
PDCI + FV + SDI FV + D + Udeur FV + D + Udeur + SDI
Luxembourg CSV + LSAP CSV + DP CSV + DP CSV + DP CSV + DP
Netherlands PvdA + VVD + D66 PvdA + VVD + D66 PvdA + VVD + D66 PvdA + VVD + D66 CDA + VVD + LPF
Portugal PS PS PS PS PSD + CDS-PP
Spain PP PP PP PP PP
Sweden SAP SAP SAP SAP SAP
UK LP LP LP LP LP
Notes: Austria – SPÖ: Social Democratic Party of Austria; ÖVP: Austrian People’s Party; FPÖ: Freedom Party of Austria. Belgium – Agalev: (Flemish) ecologists; CVP: (Flemish) Christian People’s Party; Ecolo: (Walloon)
ecologists; FDF: (Brussels) Democratic Front of Francophones; PRL: (Walloon) Liberal Reformist Party; PS: (Walloon) Socialist Party; SP: (Flemish) Socialist Party (from 2001, SP.A); VLD: Flemish Liberals and Democrats.
Denmark – KF: Conservative People’s Party; V: Venstre, ‘Left’, or Liberal Party; RV: Radical (Left-Social) Liberal Party; SD: Social Democracy in Denmark; Germany – SPD: Social Democratic Party; Die Grünen: The Greens.
Finland – KOK: national Coalition Party; SDP: Finnish Social Democratic Party; SFP: Swedish People’s Party in Finland; VAS: Left-Wing Alliance; VIHR: Green League. France – PS: Socialist Party; UDF: Union for French
Democracy (confederation to 1998; then single party); RPR: Rally for the Republic (disbanded 21 Sep 2002); PCF: French Communist Party; PRS: Radical Socialist Party (then PRG); PRG: Radical Party of the Left; MDC:
Citizens’ Movement; DL: Liberal Democracy; Les Verts: The Greens. Greece – PASOK: Panhellenic Socialist Movement. Ireland – FF: Fianna Fáil; PD: Progressive Democrats. Italy – DC: Christian Democracy; DS: Democrats of
the Left; D: Democrats; FI: Forward (Forza) Italy; LN: Northern League; AN: National Alliance; CCD: Christian Democratic Centre; CDU: United Christian Democrats; PPI: Italian People’s Party; RI: Italian Renewal; UDR:
Democratic Union for the Republic; FV: Federation of Greens; PDCI: Party of the Italian Communists; SDI: Italian Democratic Socialists; Udeur: Union of the Democratic European Reformers. Luxembourg – CSV: Christian
Social People’s Party; LSAP: Luxembourg Socialist Workers’ Party; DP: Democratic Party. Netherlands – CDA: Christian Democratic Appeal; PvdA: Labour Party; VVD: People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy; D66:
Democrats 66; LPF: List Pim Fortuyn. Portugal – PSD: Social Democratic Party; PS: Socialist Party; CDS–PP: Social Democratic Centre–Popular Party. Spain – PP: Partido Popular. Sweden – SAP: Social Democratic Labour
Party. United Kingdom – LP: Labour Party
Source: http://www.terra.es/personal2/monolith/00europa.htm.
complete unity and 5 would suggest that the majority of party activists
oppose the position of the leadership. Position captures the attitude of the
party towards European integration. A high score indicates a favourable
position; a low score indicates Euroscepticism. The existing literature would
suggest that the relationship should be positive: parties more favourable
towards European integration should also be more interested in taking on
committee work. Salience measures how important European integration is
for the party. The scale goes from 1 to 7, where 1 means that the party does
not think that European integration is important and 7 would mean that
European integration is the most important issue for the party. From the
existing literature it might be expected that the effect is positive: the more
importance a party attaches to European integration, the more committee
work the party is willing to undertake. EP is a measure of party leadership
positions on the power of the European Parliament. The scale goes from 1 to
7, where 1 means that the party is against expanding the powers of the EP,
and 7 indicates that the party favours strengthening the EP.
Results
This section first presents some descriptive statistics before moving on to
analyse the results from the regression models. Table 2 shows the conditional
mean number of codecision reports per year and standard deviations in the
different party groups, conditional on being represented in the Council. We
see that the overall mean number of reports per year in the two groups is 0.58
and 0.98 for opposition and governing parties, respectively. There are differ-
ences within the different party groups as well. Christian Democratic parties
(EPP) that hold national cabinet posts write on average 1.55 codecision
reports, whereas their colleagues out of office write only 1.11 on average.
There is a similar pattern for socialist (PES) governing and opposition parties.
Those represented in the Council write on average 1.33 codecision reports,
whereas those that are not represented write on average 0.99. The pattern that
national parties represented in the Council write more codecision reports is
consistent across all party groups, but the difference between the two
subgroups varies across party groups. The descriptive data show substantial
variation within each subgroup.
The fact that the conditional variance is greater than the conditional mean
suggests that a binomial model is more suitable than a standard Poisson
model for analysing the data. I consider two specifications (see Table 3).
Model 1 contains only the variables related to the hypothesis: whether the
party is represented in the Council; its location in the policy space; and the
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size of the party delegation measured by the number of MEPs. Model 2
includes control variables. Because the effect of location in the policy space
might differ between those national parties represented in the Council and
those that are not represented, I also introduce an interaction effect between
government and policy, labelled interaction.
The Vuong test indicates that a zero-inflated negative binomial model is
favoured over the negative binomial model (see Long, 1997: 248). The likeli-
hood χ2 tests for both models are highly significant (χ2 = 130.09, p-value ≈
.000 for the reduced model, and χ2 = 176.92, p-value ≈ .000 for the full
model). Hence, both of them explain some of the variation in the data.
Comparing the log-likelihoods of the two models gives a likelihood χ2 ratio
of 62.59, which is highly significant. Thus, the hypothesis that the full model
does not offer additional explanatory power is rejected. Testing the different
groups of explanatory parameters, we have to reject the hypothesis that the
variables measuring the effect of party group (χ2 = 8.58, p-value = .036),
institutional considerations (χ2 = 25.79, p-value = .001) or representation in
the Council and location in the policy space (χ2 = 12.81, p-value = .001)3 are
jointly zero.
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Table 2 Conditional mean number of codecision reports by party group
Governing parties Opposition parties
—————————————— ——————————–———
Standard Standard 
EP party group Mean deviation Mean deviation
EPP 1.553 2.947 1.113 2.203
PES 1.333 1.903 0.987 1.542
ELDR 0.545 0.869 0.456 0.846
Green 0.428 0.598 0.327 0.625
GUE 0.143 0.378 0.264 0.524
EDD – – 0.320 0.557
UEN 0.167 0.408 0.000 0.000
Not attached 0.429 0.535 0.242 0.867
Average 0.982 1.892 0.576 1.383
Source: Own calculations based on data obtained from the European Parliament webpage; URL:
http://www.europarl.eu.int/oeil.
Notes: EPP: European People’s Party (Christian Democrats); PES: Socialist Group in the European
Parliament; ELDR: Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; Green: Greens/European Free
Alliance; GUE: European United Left; EDD: Europe of Democracy and Diversity; UEN: Union for
Europe of the Nations.
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Table 3 Zero-inflated negative binomial model: allocation of codecison reports, annually, by national party
Model 1 Model 2
———————————————————————————— ————————————————————————————
B-coefficient Z-score Y-coefficient Z-score B-coefficient Z-score Y-coefficient Z-score
Constant –0.818 –3.77 *** 1.573 2.97 ** –3.642 –4.30 *** –1.697 –0.41
Government 0.355 2.15 ** 0.082 0.11 0.307 2.00 * 1.236 1.12
Policy 0.552 2.70 ** 2.169 2.55 * 0.952 2.31 * 8.336 2.01 *
Interaction – – – – 1.623 4.23 *** 11.623 2.63 **
Party size 0.067 7.42 *** –0.583 –2.09 ** 0.050 5.51 *** –1.506 –2.85 **
Position – – – – –0.337 –2.88 ** –0.533 –0.70
Salience – – – – 0.097 0.60 –2.432 –1.32
Dissent – – – – 0.360 2.17 * 2.264 1.86
EP – – – – 0.666 4.49 *** 2.363 2.23 *
EPP – – – – 0.235 0.54 –4.790 –1.25
Green – – – – 0.547 1.44 1.400 0.67
PES – – – – 1.214 2.94 ** 5.207 1.56
ELDR – – – – 0.343 0.94 –3.170 1.23
Log-likelihood –472.633 –441.337
ln alpha –1.092 –2.88 –1.63 –3.48
Alpha 0.334 – 0.196 –
Obs 529 529
Non-zero obs 168 168
Zero obs 361 361
LR χ2 130.09*** 176.92***
Vuong test 3.18 *** 4.52 ***
LR test alpha = 0 18.57 *** 8.66**
Sources: European Parliament webpage (www.europarl.eu.int/oeil), Marks and Steenbergen (2004), European governments (www.terra.es/personal2/monolith/00europa.htm).
* > .05; ** > .01; *** > .001
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Table 4 Factor change in the expected number of codecision reports
Model 1 Model 2
——————————————————————————— —————————————————————————————
Factor Factor
Factor Factor change in the Factor Factor change in the 
Factor change in change in the probability Factor change in the change in the probability 
change in the number probability of not writing change in number of probability of not writing 
the number of reports of of not writing reports of a the number reports of a of not writing reports of a 
of reports of a standard reports of a standard of reports of standard reports of a standard 
a one unit deviation one unit deviation a one unit deviation one unit deviation 
increase in x increase in x increase in x increase in x increase in x increase in x increase in x increase in x
Government 1.426 1.179 1.085 1.039 1.359 1.153 3.441 1.776
Policy 1.737 1.298 8.748 2.787 2.59 1.568 7.5465 16.576
Interaction – – – – 5.067 1.48 171.93 51.385
Party size 1.069 1.641 0.558 0.013 1.051 1.445 0.222 0.000
Position – – – – 0.714 0.539 0.587 0.376
Salience – – – – 1.102 1.056 0.088 0.258
Dissent – – – – 1.433 1.221 9.619 3.513
EP – – – – 1.947 2.453 10.621 24.092
EPP – – – – 1.265 1.108 0.008 0.124
Green – – – – 1.729 1.204 4.055 1.608
PES – – – – 3.367 1.559 182.559 6.719
ELDR – – – – 1.409 1.138 0.042 0.304
Discussing the effect of individual variables, we see that the government
variable is significant and in the expected direction: being in government
increases the predicted production of codecision reports. Becoming repre-
sented in the Council of Ministers is associated with an increase in the
expected number of reports by 43%, controlling for party size and location in
the policy space (see Table 4). The variable measuring location in the policy
space is significant and positive, suggesting that parties located further to the
right are more frequently involved than parties on the left as codecision
rapporteurs. During the period under investigation, most governing parties
were located in the centre to left-hand side of the policy spectrum. However,
because the Council uses qualified majority voting for most policy areas
covered by the codecision procedure, the findings seem to suggest that those
parties closest to the pivot in the Council were more interested than those
further away in being involved. A one standard unit change toward the right
in the policy space is associated with an increase in the expected number of
codecision reports by 30%.
Party size is also significant and positively associated with the number
of reports. For each additional MEP, the increase in the number of codecision
reports is in the region of 7%.
The model suggests that parties located further to the right are also more
likely not to write any codecision reports at all. One standard deviation
change to the right is associated with an increase in the odds of not writing
codecision reports in any given year by a factor of 2.79. Party size is also
significant. A one member increase in the size of the national party delega-
tion to the EP makes it 44% less likely that a party will not be allocated any
codecision reports in any given year.
We now move on to the full model. Representation in the Council has a
positive and significant effect on the number of codecision reports a party
writes. The expected number of reports is 36% higher for governing parties
compared with opposition parties, holding all other variables constant. This
is very similar to the effect in the reduced model. Location in the policy space
is significant and positive. A one standard unit change to the right in the
policy space is associated with a 57% increase in the number of reports. From
the interaction term we see that the effect of location in the policy space is
stronger for governing than for opposition parties. Being represented in the
Council increases the effect of a standard deviation rightward change in the
policy location by 48% compared with a standard deviation rightward change
amongst opposition parties. The effect of location in the policy space seems
to get stronger when other factors are controlled for. The effect of party size
is positive and highly significant. An additional MEP is associated with a 5%
increase in the number of reports, holding all other variables constant. This
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is similar to the effect found in the reduced model. Overall, the variables in
the reduced model seem to be resistant to the introduction of the control vari-
ables.
The effect of party position on European integration is significant and
negative, suggesting that a pro-integrationist stand is associated with fewer,
not more, codecision reports. A standard deviation increase in support for
European integration decreases the expected number of codecision reports by
46%. Salience of European integration does not seem to have an independent
statistical significant effect on the number of codecision reports. Party dissent
over integration has a positive, and significant, effect on the number of
reports. A standard deviation increase in party dissent is associated with a
22% increase in the number of codecision reports. Institutional preference for
a stronger European Parliament has a positive, and highly significant, effect
on the number of reports. A one standard deviation increase more than
doubles the expected number codecision reports (by a factor of 2.45).
Amongst the party groups, only membership in the PES has a significant
impact on the number of codecision reports. The effect is positive: national
parties affiliated with the PES have an expected number of codecision reports
that is 56% higher than that for parties from the smaller party groups. The
effect is significant when compared with the EPP (χ2 = 6.07, p-value = .013)
and the ELDR (χ2 = 6.01, p-value = .014) but not when compared with the
Greens (χ2 = 2.55, p-value = .11).
The factors associated with failure to write any codecision report are only
partly the same as the factors associated with the number of reports parties
write. As we also found in model 1, whether a party is represented in the
Council or not does not seem to have any influence on the probability of not
writing codecision reports. Again, as in model 1, location in the policy space
is significant and positive, indicating that parties on the right are more likely
than parties on the left not to be involved as rapporteurs in the codecision
process. A standard deviation change to the right is associated with a 51 times
increase in the likelihood of not writing reports. The effect of a standard devi-
ation move to the right for governing parties is even larger, increasing the
effect of such a change from a 51 times increase to a 67 times increase in the
likelihood of not writing any reports. The effect of a rightward change in the
location in the policy space is hence twofold. Such a shift is, on the one hand,
associated with an increase in the number of reports, if the party is likely to
be in the subset of parties that are allocated codecision reports. Such a shift
is, on the other hand, also associated with an increase in the likelihood of
being amongst those parties that never write any codecision reports at all.
The size of the national party delegation has a significant effect on the
likelihood of being amongst the parties that do not write any codecision
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reports. The direction is negative, as expected. The fewer the MEPs, the more
likely it is that the party does not get to write any of these reports. The effect
of a one member decrease in the size of the delegation is a 78% increase in
the likelihood of being in the group of parties that do not get a chance to
write codecision reports. Compared with model 1, we see that the effect of
one additional MEP is even larger once other factors have been controlled for.
It is also interesting to note that the effect of a one member change in the size
of the national party delegation has a much larger effect on the likelihood of
not writing any codecision reports at all compared with the effect it has on
the number of codecision reports.
Table 5 compares the predicted probabilities of being allocated 0, 1, 2, 3,
4 and 5 or more codecision reports annually for governing and opposition
parties. The first two columns give the predicted probabilities of the differ-
ent numbers of reports, holding all other variables constant at their mean.
Columns 3 and 4 show the difference between governing and opposition
parties within the PES, and columns 5 and 6 show the difference between
governing and opposition parties within the EPP. Overall, we see that govern-
ing parties have a higher predicted number of codecision reports and a lower
level of not writing any reports in a particular year, given that it is in the
group that tries to write reports. The table also shows that governing parties
have a higher predicted probability than opposition parties of any positive
number of reports. The overall picture is hence that governing parties are
more likely than opposition parties to write codecision reports. The picture
is modified when we investigate the effect of being represented in the Council
within the two main party groups. In particular, we see a different pattern
within the PES compared with the overall pattern and with the pattern within
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Table 5 Change in predicted annual number of codecision reports by
representation in the Council of Ministers
Governing Opposition Governing Opposition 
Number parties parties parties parties 
of reports Government Opposition from PES from PES from EPP from EPP
Expected number .688 .507 .844 .929 .595 .438
Always 0 .002 .001 .467 .203 .000 .000
0 .525 .617 .601 .482 .570 .657
1 .318 .284 .162 .265 .304 .265
2 .115 .079 .117 .150 .097 .064
3 .033 .017 .066 .066 .024 .012
4 .008 .003 .032 .025 .005 .002
5 or more .002 .001 .022 .012 .001 .000
the EPP. Whereas being a governing party increases the predicted probabil-
ity of any positive number of codecision reports within the EPP, being in
government has a negative effect on the probability of being allocated
between 1 and 3 codecision reports within the PES. The effect of being a
governing party becomes positive only for higher numbers of reports. We also
see that, within the two main party groups, it is only national party delega-
tions within PES that have a non-trivial probability of not being involved as
codecision rapporteurs at all.
Discussion
As a first step towards a bicameral explanation of legislative politics in the
codecision procedure, this paper has investigated how sitting in the Council
influences how many codecision reports members of national parties write
each year. Modelling the relationship in a signalling context, the importance
of credibility was highlighted. To the extent that MEPs from governing parties
share policy preferences with their ministers, the model suggested that there
would be more of an incentive for governing parties than for opposition
parties to write reports. It is less costly for MEPs from parties represented in
the Council to obtain reliable information about possible win-sets in Council.
The statistical model found support for this assertion. National parties sitting
in the Council have a higher expected number of allocated codecision reports
than do parties not represented in the Council. This is in line with recent
findings that highlight the role of national parties in EU politics (Messmer,
2003; Raunio, 2000; Whitaker, 2001, 2005). A next step would be to investi-
gate in more detail the relationship between the rapporteur and the privi-
leged actors in the Council, in particular the Council presidency (e.g. Farrell
and Héritier, 2003, 2004).
The results also suggest that shared policy preferences, and not just
formal membership, increase the number of reports. During the period under
investigation, the Council was predominantly populated by social democratic
parties. We saw that opposition parties from the social democratic party
group (PES) were even more active than governing parties as codecision
rapporteurs. This seems to suggest that party group might play a role in facili-
tating the transmission of information. This is in line with the literature, which
emphasizes the importance of transnational party groups in structuring
behaviour in the Parliament in particular (Hix et al., 2005) and in the whole
of the EU political system more generally (Hix, 1993).
The model may provide a framework for studying the Conciliation
Committee negotiations. It has been argued that the Parliament might have
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the upper hand in conciliation negotiations because it may be more patient
than the Council (Rittberger, 2000). One possibility would be to compare the
common position of the Council and the second reading’s EP amendments
with the outcome of the Conciliation Committees, because these documents
form the basis for the conciliation negotiations.
If the model provides some insights into EU legislative politics, it should
also be able to explain the design of the codecision procedure and why
governments have increased its scope through consecutive treaty reforms.
This is an issue of controversy in the EU literature (Moravcsik and Nicolaidis,
1999; Hix, 2002a). Although the reform of the Codecision procedure may have
reduced the power of the Commission (Crombez, 2000; Tsebelis and Garrett,
2000), it potentially gives more power to the Council presidency, its working
groups and the EP rapporteur by allowing for early agreement. The EP’s
absolute majority requirement for amending the common position of the
Council, combined with a decrease in the payoff from having the legislation
adopted at a later stage and uncertainty regarding the outcome, may be
sufficient punishment to induce truth-telling by both the rapporteur and the
privileged groups in the Council (Farrell and Héritier, 2004; Strøm, 1998). The
condition is that the privileged actors in the Council and the EP rapporteur
prefer the qualified majority pivot in the Council to adopt a coordinated
position rather than proposing its own recommendation to the Council. The
qualified majority pivot will also have to prefer adopting the coordinated
suggestion to any other winnable proposal. By allowing legislation to be
adopted at the Council’s first reading, the cost of non-agreement seems to
suggest that legislative stalemates should occur only on policies where the cost
of delay is low relative to the potential cost of a policy change. Both the
rapporteur and the privileged actors in the Council have incentives to coordi-
nate their signals, and the pivotal government also has a bigger incentive to
make concessions on the more urgent policies. Hence, reform of the procedure
to allow for the adoption of codecision legislation in the Council’s first reading
makes the EU legislative process more efficient when it is necessary, while
allowing for lengthier negotiations when the potential policy implications are
high. It therefore allows for both efficiency and political contestation.
Finally, if there are differences between rapporteurs with different charac-
teristics in the probability of securing the optimal policy payoff on behalf of
their principal, this should have implications for how reports are allocated
within committees and how parties allocate committee assignments amongst
their members. Studies of committee assignments have focused on either
describing the distribution of reports amongst different subgroups of the EP
(e.g. Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003), testing distributive and informational
models (Kaeding, 2004) or investigating to what extent committee assignments
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can be used to discipline members (McElroy, 2002). The power of the EP
committees, and of their rapporteurs, party group coordinators and chairmen,
is often highlighted (e.g. Tsebelis, 1995; Wurzel, 1999), and the EP rules of
procedure make it easier for committee members than for non-committee
members to amend legislation, but it has not been shown that these formal
rules correspond to committee protection to the same extent as is assumed in
the formal models of legislative organization developed in the American
context (Cox and McCubbins, 1993; Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1987; Shepsle and
Weingast, 1987). The study of the allocation of EP reports and of the legisla-
tive organization of the EP would benefit from a careful analysis of the be-
havioural incentives created by the formal rules regulating floor amendments,
in particular at the different stages in the codecision procedure.
Notes
I would like to thank Giacomo Benedetto, Fabio Franchino, Charles H. Franklin,
Sara Hagemann, Pierre Hausemer, Simon Hix, Joni Kuha, David J. Marshall,
Gerald Schneider, Jennifer Van Heerde and three anonymous reviewers for useful
comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this paper. Financial support
from the ESRC is acknowledged.
1 The first-order condition of f = (ki – ci)/ci is f = –(ki/c2i ). We see that, as
the cost, c, of coordinating their message goes up, the frequency of being
involved goes down, holding the rights to be involved, k, constant. The
second-order derivative is f = 2ki/c3i. Because both k and c are positive, this
is always positive. Hence we have found a minimum point. By symmetry we
see that, as the cost of being involved goes down, the frequency of involve-
ment goes up.
2 All legislation was collected from www.europarl.eu.int/oeil, May 2004. The
dataset is available on the author’s webpage: www.ucl.ac.uk/spp/people/
bjorn-hoyland.php
3 If the interaction effect is included in this test, χ2 = 36.27, p-value ≈ .000.
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